During armed conflicts healthcare workers or medical personnel often work under extremely difficult and dangerous circumstances. In such situations doctors and nurses, hospitals and medical units are at a serious risk of being attacked. Medical personnel also face complex ethical dilemmas when it comes to the treatment of patients from all sides of a conflict. This concerns military medical personnel in particular: as members of the armed forces, they face dilemmas of 'dual loyalty' where they may have to choose between the interests of their employer (the military) and the interests of their patients. This contribution looks at these issues from the perspectives of medical ethics, international humanitarian law (ihl), and human rights law (hrl). The article argues that the standards of medical ethics continue to apply during armed conflicts, and that during such situations medical ethics, ihl and hrl are mutually reinforcing. The principle of 'medical neutrality' and the human 'right to health' are positioned as key norms in this field. The article presents a normative framework for the delivery of health care on the battlefield in the form of a set of commitments for actors involved in the conflict, including the belligerent parties and (military) medical personnel.
Introduction
This contribution focuses on the difficulties surrounding the delivery of healthcare services during armed conflicts.1 As will be illustrated more elaborately below, the delivery of healthcare services on the battlefield raises a number of problematic issues, varying from attacks on healthcare personnel and their units, to the difficult ethical dilemmas faced by, in particular, healthcare workers that are embedded in the military. The aim of this contribution is to underline that during armed conflicts, healthcare workers (or medical personnel) do not operate in a moral and legal vacuum. The paper attempts to demonstrate that the intertwined fields of medical ethics, international humanitarian law (ihl), and human rights law (hrl) provide a compelling framework stipulating legal and moral obligations for all sides of the conflict to respect, protect and to guarantee the safety, impartiality and neutrality of medical personnel during armed conflicts.
A core notion around which this analysis will revolve is the so-called principle of 'medical neutrality' . As will be clarified below, while this principle is a key concept of medical ethics, it also finds explicit recognition in ihl and hrl standards. The British Medical Association (bma) explains that 'medical neutrality' embraces two dimensions: firstly, healthcare providers delivering care impartially must not be attacked or persecuted for doing so; and secondly, healthcare providers should practice medicine impartially without regard to factors such as the nationality, class, sex, religion or political beliefs of the patient.2
As such, the first dimension of medical neutrality pertains to the notion that all healthcare workers should be able to carry out their duties and to use their hospitals and medical equipment in an undisturbed fashion. According to the icrc study 'Healthcare in Danger' , around the world, people who risk their lives to provide health care in conflict areas are under a serious threat:
Hospitals in Somalia and Sri Lanka are shelled; ambulances in Libya and Lebanon are shot at; medical personnel in Bahrain face trial for treating protestors; and health staff in Afghanistan receive threats from both sides to stop working with or treating 'the enemy' . From Colombia to Gaza, the journal of international humanitarian legal studies 4 (2013) 197-219 Democratic Republic of the Congo to Nepal, there is a lack of respect for the neutral status of health-care personnel, facilities and transport, by both those attacking them and those who misuse them for military gain.3
The second dimension of medical neutrality concerns the position of military medical personnel in particular. Given that military personnel are members of the armed forces, they may be confronted with difficult ethical dilemmas where there may be a need to choose between the concerns of the employer (the military), and the patient. Such dilemmas, often addressed as conflicts of 'dual loyalty' or 'mixed agency' arise where their professional duty to preserve life is not in conformity with their professional duty towards their employer, or their personal wish to serve the military. While on many occasions there will be no conflict between these duties, situations could arise where military personnel may be pressured to compromise their professional duty to care for the sick and wounded for the sake of military objectives.4 A study by Physicians for Human Rights provides a number of illustrative examples of situations where the medical doctors' professional duty is compromised. To mention a few:
• They may be asked to attend first to soldiers with less severe wounds as a means to return them to battle; • They may be asked to declare an entire troop fit for engagement when they are not; • They may be compelled to prepare a sick soldier as quickly as possible for a new battle situation; • They may be called to participate in interrogation of suspects of terrorism, which may culminate in torture or cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment; • They may be asked to prepare and be present at executions; • They may be asked to administer pharmaceutical substances or vaccines to (own or enemy) soldiers without medical justification; • They may be called to participate in research into or experimentation with biological, chemical or pharmaceutical substances on humans while foregoing medical ethical principles.5
These dilemmas raise intricate questions under medical ethics, ihl, and hrl, including the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the right to privacy, and the right to health. This paper focuses on the provision of healthcare on and around the battlefield, specifically, on issues surrounding 'triage' , i.e. the process of determining the order of treatment of patients or casualties. As will be shown below, medical ethics (e.g. the principles of neutrality, confidentiality and informed consent), ihl, and hrl (in particular, the right to health), provide a legal-ethical framework upon which military medical personnel need to act and operate. The paper will introduce hrl and medical ethics as two fields that need to be taken into account when it comes to armed conflicts, in addition to the rules of ihl. To do so, it will first discuss a few preliminary legal questions that arise when applying these intertwined fields of ethics and law during armed conflicts. Subsequently, it will present the legal framework applicable to belligerent forces (as those that have to respect, protect and guarantee the safety of military medical personnel and their medical units) and to military medical personnel (as those who have to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of the wounded and sick).
1
Healthcare on the Battlefield: The Intersection Between the Standards and Their Applicability It was suggested above that the intertwined areas of medical ethics, ihl, and hrl provide a normative framework for healthcare provision on and around the battlefield and other emergency situations. This raises the question of how these different fields relate to one another, and whether priority should be given to one area over another. Firstly, it is worth observing that both ihl and hrl give clear cognizance of the principles of medical ethics. In terms of ihl, we see that Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions explicitly refers to medical ethics, stating that " [u] nder no circumstances shall any person be punished for having carried out medical activities compatible with medical ethics, regardless of the person benefiting therefrom".6As such, the body of ihl affirms that medical ethics are an important discipline during armed conflicts and closely entwined with ihl. When it comes to hrl and the right to health in particular, we see that General Comment 14 on the Right to Health, which will be discussed further below, contains a similar reference:
All health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of medical ethics and culturally appropriate, i.e. respectful of the culture of individuals, minorities, peoples and communities, sensitive to gender and life-cycle requirements, as well as being designed to respect confidentiality and improve the health status of those concerned.7
Similarly therefore, medical ethics are recognized as important interconnected principles under hrl.
Thirdly, the question arises how ihl and hrl relate to one another when it comes to their applicability during armed conflicts. While the starting point has previously been that during armed conflicts, ihl functions as the lex specialis (more specific law) in relation to the more general human rights norms,8 the International Court of Justice (icj) has recently argued in favor of a more fluid approach in its Advisory Opinion concerning the construction of a Wall in Palestine (Wall Opinion), stating that "[…] some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law".9 This could give room for the approach that where hrl is more detailed in regulating a certain matter, it would be the primary source of law.10 Below it will be argued that the right to health, in connection with other health-related rights, contains more detailed provisions in relation to certain matters, in particular when it comes to the allocation of medical services and the regulation of the patient-doctor relationship. In such situations, therefore, these health-related human rights may function as the lex specialis, i.e. the more specific norms that should apply when it comes to providing care on the battlefield. For the purposes of this article, we need to address this question in particular with regard to economic, social and cultural rights, as the analysis is primarily concerned with the right to health, which is generally considered to form part of this category of rights.11 Unlike the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (icescr) does not single out a set of non-derogable rights, i.e. rights which cannot be deviated from during armed conflicts and other situations of emergency.12 However, it is increasingly argued that there is a minimum level of protection inherent in economic, social and cultural rights that should remain intact under all circumstances, including armed conflicts (see further below).13 Below, in the analysis of the right to health, an overview of the relevant minimum obligations will be presented (see Box 4).
Another complexity that arises during international armed conflicts (iacs) concerns the extraterritorial applicability of hrl, for during iacs belligerent states may violate rights outside their territory. Article 2(1) of the iccpr affirms that the rights set forth in that treaty apply on the State's territory. However, this position is eroding to a certain extent. Case law supporting the extraterritorial applicability of civil and political human rights now requires that a State exercise 'effective control' over a territory or a certain public power in the territory concerned.14 The question arises whether the same approach can be upheld with respect to icescr, which does not contain a provision on its scope of application.15 In its Wall Opinion, the icj explains that this is because, "[…] this Covenant contains rights which are essentially territorial. However, it is not to be excluded that it applies both to territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to those over which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction".16 The icj subsequently concludes that Israel is bound by the provisions of the icescr and that "it is under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities".17 The difficult question that arises is what the extent of such obligations is, and whether this would also amount to a 'positive' duty to provide minimum health services in occupied territories. Based on the notion of 'minimum core obligations' (see further below), there are strong reasons to assume that Occupying States not only have negative obligations to respect the rights, but that they also have positive duties to realize the core elements of economic, social and cultural rights. This implies that they have duties to provide minimum socio-economic services to residents in territories under their occupation. For the right to health in Article 12 of the icescr specifically, this means that occupying states do not only have obligations to respect the undisturbed delivery of healthcare services, but that they also have positive obligations to provide essential health services in the territories that fall under their occupation. The last complicating factor concerns the question whether hrl can also bind non-state actors that -contrary to States -have not ratified the human rights treaties. This question arises in particular with regard to non-international armed conflicts (niacs) and other situations of internal unrest. For the purposes of our analysis, we need to address this question in relation to two groups: firstly, armed opposition groups, as those who potentially violate the medical neutrality of health workers during armed conflicts; and secondly, military medical personnel, as key actors in the delivery of health services on the battlefield. Are these groups also bound by hrl? When it comes to armed opposition groups, of decisive importance will be if and to what extent the armed opposition group concerned is taking over state functions. For, as Zegveld points out, the primary purpose of human rights is to check abuse of State power; hence the justification for armed opposition groups being bound may lie in the circumstances under which these groups operate.18 Along these lines, Bellal et al. argue that an important factor in determining whether these groups are bound by hrl, will be whether they exercise an element of governmental functions and whether they have de facto authority over a population.19 Arguing that they can be bound by hrl is in line with the increasing call on non-state actors to adhere to the human rights standards.20 Furthermore, the question arises whether medical professionals may also have responsibilities in relation to human rights, as important non-state actors in this field. First and foremost, they may carry certain indirect responsibilities in relation to the direct obligations of belligerent forces. This is because they are often at the forefront of situations where human rights violations by the belligerent forces are committed. As such, they may acquire important information about potential human rights violations that may be essential to report. However, the additional question is whether they may also carry direct legal responsibilities under hrl, i.e. whether by fulfilling their professional duties they may become complicit in human rights violations. A specific case can be made here in relation to military medical personnel. As military personnel, they are directly employed by the armed forces, an organ of the State; and as such they are State agents.21 It can be argued that in this position, they carry direct responsibilities under hrl.
A
Relevant Medical-ethical Standards This section looks at relevant medical-ethical standards as the key moral principles in the healthcare field. Medical-ethical standards can be described as moral principles that apply to the practice of medicine and that are concerned with the way in which medical professionals exercise their occupation.22 Medical-ethical principles are not legally binding norms; therefore, from a legal perspective, they may carry less weight than ihl and hrl. They are nonetheless authoritative in the health field and are therefore taken as a starting point in this analysis.
An important point of departure for analyzing the ethical duties of medical personnel is the Declaration of Geneva (World Medical Association, wma). Representing doctors' organizations from most countries in the world, the wma is a source of authoritative normative guidance. This document, which can be seen as a modern equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath, asks physicians to pledge that the health of their patients will be their first consideration and that they will not permit "considerations of age, disease or disability, creed, ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political affiliation, race, sexual orientation, social standing or any other factor to intervene between my duty and my patient".23 This is the principle of medical neutrality, which was also mentioned at the outset of this paper.
When it comes to armed conflicts, the question arises whether this principle, and other medical-ethical standards apply unconditionally or whether they can be waived. The wma has continuously argued in favor of the applicability of 'peacetime' medical ethics during armed conflicts. In 1956, it adopted the Regulations in Times of Armed Conflict.24 Article 1 of this document states that:
Medical ethics in times of armed conflict is identical to medical ethics in times of peace, as stated in the International Code of Medical Ethics of the wma. If, in performing their professional duty, physicians have conflicting loyalties, their primary obligation is to their patients; in all their professional activities, physicians should adhere to international conventions on human rights, international humanitarian law and wma declarations on medical ethics.25
In addition, these Regulations seek to ensure the undisturbed and safe delivery of healthcare services, and the security of healthcare personnel (Regulation 5). Furthermore, physicians must be granted access to patients, medical facilities, and equipment and the protection needed to carry out their professional activities freely (Regulation 12).
Notwithstanding the existence of these Regulations, in medical-ethical circles there remains much disagreement over whether medical-ethical standards Strategic necessity -that is, the need to wage war in pursuit of legitimate national interests -firmly limits the medical rights that both combatants and noncombatant patients enjoy. Tactical necessity -the need to develop efficient means to wage war and achieve particular military objectives -will restrict access to medical care, will govern the distribution of scare resources, and may compel physicians to lend their expertise to the development of weapons systems.28
As a result, Gross has difficulty with the recognition of human rights on the battlefield:
The right to medical care is an abiding problem for military medical ethics precisely because of the tendency to grant inordinate weight to Undoubtedly, war raises tremendous moral dilemmas, but morally just decisions can also be taken in dire situations with limited resources. This author argues that even where resources are limited, there is no moral justification for giving priority to one's own soldiers, or for declaring soldiers fit to fight, when they are not. This is also the position taken in the above-mentioned wma For health professionals, a human rights framework provides a steady moral compass, a blueprint of a just and humane social order that at its core articulates the principles of the dignity and equality of every human being.
[…] a human rights analysis enables the health professional to resolve these conflicts by reference to an agreed-upon, universally applicable set of moral principles.32
Given this close connection between medical ethics, ihl, and hrl, and the importance of their intertwined applicability during armed conflicts, we will now turn to an analysis of the applicable norms of ihl and hrl.
These instruments also contain additional rules stipulating that medical personnel falling into the hands of the enemy should receive the same treatment of prisoners of war; that transports of the wounded and sick have to be respected and protected; and that medical aircraft shall not be attacked.35 During niacs, the main rule that applies is 'common Article 3' of the Geneva Conventions, which contains a set of minimum standards for the protection of those who do not take active part in the hostilities, including the wounded and sick.36 This standard does not provide explicit protection of medical personnel. According to the icrc, however, we may assume that this provision embraces the protection of medical personnel, as it can be seen as a subsidiary form of protection granted to ensure that the wounded and sick receive medical care.37 Furthermore, Additional Protocol II,38 contains an explicit rule that medical personnel must be respected and protected.39 And, as mentioned above, Rule 25 of Customary International Humanitarian Law applies.
In this context, it is also worth pointing out that many domestic military manuals contain rules regulating the inviolability of medical personnel.40 The protection of medical personnel during armed conflicts is also enshrined in many domestic legal systems. Furthermore, the Statute of the International Criminal Court considers "[…] intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law" to be a war crime.41 
C

The Human Rights Framework and the Provision of Healthcare During Armed Conflicts
In this section the meaning and implications of the internationally guaranteed human right to health will be dissected. The term 'right to health' is shorthand for the 'right to the highest attainable standard of health' as provided in Article 12 of the icescr. As pointed out by the former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Paul Hunt, the right to health is a firmly established feature of binding international law.42 In addition to Article 12, further provisions in a number of other international human rights instruments also recognize the right to health.43 Furthermore, a study by Backman et al. has analysed the domestic implementation of the right to health. The study reveals that 63 national constitutional provisions, bills of rights, or other statutes include a right to health.44 Finally, an increasing amount of case law on the right to health generated by national and international judicial bodies points to the increasing enforceability or 'justiciability' of the right to health. 45 A detailed explanation of the right to health is provided by un General Comment 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, which is an explanatory document on Article 12 icescr adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Treaty-Monitoring body to the icescr (cescr 2000). Although strictly speaking not legally binding, this document is the most authoritative document on the right to health. Therefore, this paper closely follows the approach taken in the General Comment.
The right to health is an inclusive right which not only extends to timely and appropriate healthcare services, but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and information.46 This is also reinforced by the notion that, as the General Comment explains, the right to health is closely related to and dependent upon the realisation of other human rights.47 When it comes to securing health in armed conflicts, other important rights include the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the right to privacy and family life, and the rights to shelter, safe drinking water and sanitation. So for battlefield situations the right to health, in conjunction with other health-related rights, not only implies a right to medical services but also the realisation of a number of conditions to health. The General Comment also identifies a set of principles that apply at all levels of the health sector that are also important in relation to the ensuring the safe delivery of healthcare services on the battlefield: availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities (the so-called 'aaaq').48 As pointed out by the former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, this framework is especially relevant to policy analysis, while the identification of obligations further on in this paper (obligations to 'respect, protect and fulfill') may be more suited to legal analysis.49 Accessibility has four overlapping dimensions: non-discrimination, physical accessibility, economic accessibility (affordability), and information accessibility.50 The un General Comments on the other substantive rights in the icescr contain similar principles, and also in a national health law context references are made to such principles.51
Furthermore, the General Comment distinguishes between so-called State obligations to 'respect' , to 'protect' , and to 'fulfill' the right to health. The obligation to respect the right to health is a negative obligation to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health. The obligation to protect requires States to take legislative and other measures that prevent third parties including private insurers, private health care providers, and suppliers from interfering with the guarantees under the right to health. Finally, the obligation to fulfill requires States to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional, and other measures towards the full realisation of the right to health.52
Lastly, it has been argued on several occasions that there is a minimum level of protection inherent in economic, social and cultural rights that should remain intact under all circumstances, including armed conflicts.53 The un has consolidated this approach by means of the recognition of a 'minimum core' in economic, social and cultural rights: the idea that there is a minimum set of obligations inherent in these rights which should be guaranteed under all circumstances, including armed conflicts.54 Along these lines, General Comment 14 defines a set of core obligations, i.e. minimum entitlements flowing from the right to health that exist under all circumstances.55 It can be argued that such minimum obligations also apply during armed conflicts (see Box 4).
Towards a Legal and Moral Framework for the Provision of Healthcare on the Battlefield
In this section, an attempt is made to bring together all the norms and subsequent duties that flow from the norms presented above. To clarify the various undertakings, a number of Boxes are presented. Box 1 illustrates how safe and adequate healthcare delivery is protected through various norms under ihl, hrl, and medical ethics. While the context, applicability and enforceability of these norms differ, there is considerable normative overlap between the various standards so defined: Box 1 illustrates that while ihl has a more limited applicability during niacs, human rights law and medical ethics apply in the same fashion during both niacs and iacs. This underlines the importance of relying on human rights and ethical standards during niacs. Subsequently, we must specify the various obligations of belligerent forces and military medical personnel respectively. We will do so on the basis of the three frameworks from General Comment 14 that were identified above: the aaaq; the triparte typology distinguishing between legal obligations to respect, protect and fulfill the right to health; and in relation to this, the identification of minimum core obligations. For this identification, a distinction is made between the belligerent forces (under A) and military medical personnel (under B). Ibid.
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Ibid., at 2. Other events were caused by the police (6.9 %), active fighting (6.7 %), and other people (16.5 %).
A
The Duties of the Belligerent Forces When it comes to the belligerent forces, it is important to note that non-state armed groups are also heavily involved in attacks on medical personnel and their units. In July 2011, the icrc published a study on violent incidents affecting healthcare based on an analysis of sixteen countries.57 The report concludes that the danger to healthcare workers and facilities in armed conflict and other situations of violence is widespread and serious.58 The study makes a distinction between violence affecting hospitals and other healthcare facilities, medical vehicles, and healthcare personnel.59 While in 33% of the events the violence was committed by State armed forces, in 36.9% of the events it was committed by armed groups.60 These findings underscore that State armed forces and armed groups are equally involved in such attacks and emphasize the need to also identify the obligations on the part of armed groups.
Based on the right to health framework and reinforced by medical ethics, the aaaq provides a set of principles for the provision of basic medical services on the battlefield (see Box 2). It illustrates that the parties involved in an armed conflict should guarantee the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of medical services during armed conflicts. We may assume that these commitments apply to States as well as non-state actors exercising de facto authority over a population:
Furthermore, based on the identification of legal obligations to respect, protect and fulfill, we can identify a set of commitments for parties in the conflict exercising de facto authority over a population (see Box 3). This box illustrates that based on the right to health framework, as reinforced by medical ethics and ihl, belligerent parties have legal ('negative') legal duties to respect the right to health (e.g. refraining from attacks on medical units); and ('positive') legal duties to protect and fulfill the right to health (protect medical personnel), as well as ensure access to all health-related services.
Finally, a set of minimum obligations can be identified under human hrl, which apply under all circumstances, including armed conflicts. Box 4 denotes which minimum services should be provided during armed conflicts by those belligerent parties exercising 'de facto authority' over a population.
To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a nondiscriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the who Action Programme on Essential Drugs To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services To provide appropriate training for health personnel, including education on health and human rights 64
B
The Duties of Military Medical Personnel Next, the duties of military medical personnel should be identified. According to Michael Gross, "medical moral decision making changes substantially in wartime" and medical ethics must "compete with equally weighty and conflicting principles anchored in military necessity and national security".65 Above an attempt has been made to refute this position by arguing that during armed conflicts medical-ethical principles continue to apply, reinforced by ihl and hrl.
Firstly, when it comes to the above-mentioned aaaq, the principle of 'nondiscrimination' under 'accessibility' implies a duty on the part of medical personnel to treat everyone equally, and not to discriminate between patients on criteria other than medical ones. Also the principle of 'acceptability' is an important guidance during battlefield situations. 'Acceptability' means, inter alia, that healthcare services must be respectful of medical ethics and culturally appropriate. Being 'respectful of medical ethics' includes, according to General Comment 14, respecting the confidentiality of patients.66 With this notion the General Comment implicitly refers to patients' rights as established under various instruments. Patients' rights involve the important notion of informed consent, i.e. the duty on the part of medical professionals to ask for the consent of patients and to inform them about their conditions.67 Box 5
